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Project-based Emissions Trading Schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism,
are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between the project
parties and the regulator. Given the speciﬁcities of these schemes, the regulator’s
optimal monitoring strategy signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the one to be applied for cap-
and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. In this paper, we extend the general
framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reﬂect these speci-
ﬁcities. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s optimal
spot-check frequency under the plausible assumption that the submitted projects
vary with respect to their veriﬁability. We ﬁnd that, given a limited monitoring
budget, the optimal monitoring strategy is discontinuous, featuring a jump within
the set of projects with lower veriﬁability. In this region, actual abatement is low
and can fall to zero. For these cases, the sign of the slope of the strategy function
depends on the actual relationship of the abatement cost and the penalty function.
We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be
based on the criterion of veriﬁability.
Keywords: environmental regulation, emissions trading systems, audits and com-
pliance
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: K32, D42, D82
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1 Introduction
Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) under the Kyoto-Protocol, are particularly vulnerable to problems of incom-
plete enforcement. These problems arise due to information asymmetries between
the regulator and the project participants, creating an incentive to overstate emis-
sion reductions. Hence, the overall abatement level is likely to be lower than pre-
dicted within neoclassical setups, where the optimal amount of emission reductions
is achieved through market forces. Under the standard neoclassical assumptions the
interaction of supply and demand leads to an equalization of marginal abatement
costs and the certiﬁcate price. However, if the the above-mentioned information
asymmetries are taken into account the level of abatement achievable through credit-
based systems might be signiﬁcantly lower.
Within this paper, we develop an analytical model of a credit-based system that
takes potential overreporting of emission reductions into account. The main focus
is laid here on the optimal decisions of the regulator, given the impossibility to
fully enforce compliance to the Mechanism. Just as with any microeconomic model,
the framework presented here is not a mapping of one-to-one real world situations.
Its major objective is rather to identify the speciﬁc eﬀects of the above-mentioned
information asymmetries on the decisions of a rational benevolent regulator.1
Given the importance of enforcement for the eﬀectiveness of environmental poli-
cies, considerations of incomplete enforcement of instruments has become an impor-
tant research ﬁeld within environmental economics. Early research on incomplete
enforcement of environmental regulation has mainly focused on the comparison of
emission taxes and pollution standards. The ﬁrst formal model on this issue was
developed in Harford (1978), which was extended in Harford (1987) to include self-
reporting by ﬁrms. Within more recent research the analyses were extended to the
comparative performance of the diﬀerent environmental policy instruments under
incomplete enforcement. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) focus on the diﬀerence
between emission taxes and output taxes. Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006)
analyze the optimal enforcement policy in the context of per-unit emission taxes.
Malik (1990), Keeler (1991), Macho-Stadler (2006), and Stranlund (2007) also
include cap-and-trade programs in their analysis.
Yet, credit-based schemes seem to have been neglected in the literature so far.
To our knowledge, there exists no formal model deriving optimal monitoring for
such systems. This might be due to the fact that credit-based systems only recently
gained in importance, which is, in turn, to a large extent a result of the successful
implementation of the Kyoto markets. On the other hand, the non-consideration
of credit-based systems in the literature is particularly unfortunate in light of the
elevated potential for fraudulent misreporting within such schemes. In this paper
we present an extension of the tax-based model developed in Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo (2006), to reﬂect the speciﬁcities in incomplete enforcement under
1In the context of the Clean Development Mechanism, the role of such a regulator is taken
up by the CDM Executive Board and its supporting panels. As a consequence, the decisions
of the external veriﬁers—the Designated Operational Entities—are not explicitly modeled. This
simpliﬁcation is justiﬁable on the grounds that the CDM veriﬁcation mechanism is not capable
to fully deter opportunistic overreporting. This incomplete deterrence can be attributed to two
diﬀerent reasons. First, even a thorough veriﬁcation might not reveal opportunistic behavior in
reporting, as information asymmetries between project participants and the veriﬁer could persist.
Second, given the fact that the DOEs are remunerated by the project participants, potential
collusion in reporting of emission reductions cannot be excluded.
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credit-based schemes. As it turns out, considering credit-based emissions trading
instead of environmental taxes does signiﬁcantly alter both, the analysis as well
as the results. We ﬁnd, that depending on the relationship between certiﬁcate
prices and the penalty scheme, optimal monitoring will feature jumps and might
not necessarily be always increasing over the degree of veriﬁability of the projects.
Furthermore, the possibility to deny projects access to the scheme will, if based on
the criterion of veriﬁability, signiﬁcantly improve the performance of credit-based
mechanisms.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section the general prob-
lem of opportunistic false reporting credit-based systems is explained further. The
presentation of the formal model starts with section 3, where the abatement and
reporting decisions of a rational project developer are derived. Section 4 presents
the optimal monitoring policy of a regulator disposing of an unlimited budget. In
section 5, optimal monitoring is analyzed under the more realistic assumption of a
limited budget. The paper concludes with a discussion of the model results.
2 Incomplete Enforcement of Emission Reductions
The basic problem with any environmental regulation aiming at the reduction of
emissions is that emitters can either understate their actual emissions or overstate
the emission reductions achieved. Given that these levels are not fully observable
to the regulator, emitters have an incentive to misreport these values. In the case
of a per-unit tax on emissions, for example, the reported emissions represent the
basis from which the overall tax burden for the regulated entity is derived. While a
reduction of emissions is associated with abatement costs, fraudulent misreporting
of emissions might represent an attractive alternative for reducing the amount of
taxes paid. In a cap-and-trade emissions trading system, the situation is similar.
Here, the emitter has an incentive to increase the diﬀerence between the stipulated
emissions cap and the reported emissions. Given that emission permits have a
positive market value, an increase in this diﬀerence augments, ceteris paribus, the
beneﬁts for net sellers and decreases the costs for net buyers. Again, emitters
might be tempted to overreport actually achieved emission reductions, in order to
maximize the amount of disposable permits.
The potential for fraudulent reporting is even higher in credit-based systems, like
the Clean Development Mechanism. In such a system, the amount of certiﬁcates
generated is determined by the diﬀerence between the emissions of a baseline emis-
sion scenario and the reported project emissions. Hence, a fraudulent manipulation
is possible ex ante, through an overstatement of the baseline, as well as ex post,
through an understatement of actual project emissions. For this reason, both deter-
minants of generated certiﬁcates are subject to a scrutinized veriﬁcation within the
CDM project cycle. Yet, it is likely that information asymmetries between project
parties and the regulator persist. The baseline, for example, should ideally represent
the scenario based on what would have happened without the implementation of
the project. Clearly, any such plans for the project site are private information—
a priori unknowable to the regulator—and are not necessarily truthfully revealed
within the Project Design Document. Note that this information asymmetry with
respect to the baseline is also at the basis of the well-known discussion on the
additionality within the CDM. In addition to this baseline problem, the possibility
of underreporting the actual emissions persists, just as for the other environmental
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policy instruments mentioned above.
As a consequence of the problem of opportunistic misreporting, any environmen-
tal policy needs to include an enforcement mechanism to be eﬀective. In general,
such a mechanism involves the monitoring of actual emissions through the regu-
lator and a sanctioning of discovered fraudulent misrepresentation. In a resource-
constrained world, however, full enforcement of environmental policies is unlikely.
As monitoring of emitters is costly, the eﬀectiveness of the enforcement mechanism
is constrained by the budget available to the regulator. Under these circumstances,
it is more eﬃcient to increase the deterrence eﬀect by increasing the expected sanc-
tion through a tightening of the penalty.2 However, even if the budget constraint
of the regulator does not bite, there might be situations within which enforcement
remains incomplete. This is the case if the information asymmetry between emit-
ter and regulator is structured in such a way that the probability of discovering
fraudulent misreporting is lower than one.
The framework presented below builds heavily on the model developed in Macho-
Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006), who analyze incomplete enforcement in the
context of emission taxes. However, the adjustments made for representing a credit-
based system do signiﬁcantly alter both, the analysis as well as the results. As
will be explained below, the major diﬀerence between tax schemes and credit-based
systems is the fact that the objective function of the regulator changes with a switch
from one system to the other. As the received credits are used to oﬀset emissions
elsewhere, a regulator interested in environmental integrity has to minimize not only
the emissions, but the overall overreported amount of emission reductions. This
minimization is subject to the constraint that the project parties, in turn, minimize
their costs. For this reason the subsequent outline of the model starts with deriving
the decisions of the single projects.
3 The Decision of the Project Parties
In the following sections a scheme is considered within which private actors can
submit emission reduction or absorption projects generating credits that can be
used to oﬀset emissions occurring at an emission source which is not associated
with the project. This setup describes, hence, schemes like the CDM where the
generated credits are sold on a primary or secondary carbon market.
3.1 Decision under Full Enforcement
Throughout the following pages it is assumed that there exists a continuum of abate-
ment projects for each of which the respective project participants have invested in
a speciﬁc abatement technology determining a minimum level e and a maximum
level e of emission reductions achievable within the project, where e,e > 0. Within
these limits the project participants choose the actual level of reductions e; hence
e ∈ [e;e].3 This assumption implies that the respective project is already accepted
within the credit-scheme, but can generate diﬀerent levels of emission reductions,
2This argument is one of the main postulates derived from the economic theory of crime. See
Becker (1968).
3For example, a project might involve a fuel-switch within a power plant from coal to natural
gas. In this case the upper and lower level of project emissions are pre-determined by the actual
base demand of electricity, the applied emission factor, and the plant’s capacity.
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dependent on the abatement eﬀort levels incurred. A relaxation of this assumption
will be discussed in section 5.2. The above depicted set-up adequately describes a
large range of project types. For example, the reductions generated through fuel
switching, reforestation, or energy eﬃciency-projects are not only dependent on the
initial project investment, but also on the eﬀorts incurred to actually implement the
project itself.
It can be reasonably assumed that emission reductions cannot be generated
without costs. Hence, any level of emission reductions is associated with a respective
amount of abatement costs. The abatement cost function of the project is denoted
as c(e), with c′(e) > 0, c′′(e) > 0, for all e ∈ [e;e].
In order to establish a benchmark for the model results under incomplete en-
forcement, it is useful to ﬁrst describe the decision of the project participants for
the case where the actual project reductions are fully observable. In this case the
project participants report the emission reductions that have actually occurred, i.e.
e. The reported emission reductions are certiﬁed and can then be sold on the market
for the price p, which is assumed to be constant and publicly known. In this case,
the project participants will minimize the net costs C(e) of the project as follows:
min
e C(e), with C(e) = c(e) − pe (1)
Note that under the assumed full-information case, the ﬁrm reports exactly the
emission reductions actually achieved, and receives thus exactly e certiﬁcates, which
can be sold on the market for the price p. Hence, net costs C(e) consist of the
costs of reducing the emissions c(e) and the reduction of overall costs through the
revenue from selling the thusly generated certiﬁcates. From the ﬁrst order condi-
tion associated with (1), which determines the optimal level of emission reduction,
follows:
c′(e∗) = p (2)
Equation (2) represents the well-known result that under perfect competition
with full information the marginal abatement costs will be equal to the certiﬁcate
price. The resulting ﬁrst-best optimal level of emission reductions is denoted by e∗.
This level will be used as a benchmark for the following analysis.
3.2 Decision under Incomplete Enforcement
If incomplete enforcement is introduced within the above-described framework the
project participants’ decision might change. In case of information asymmetries
between the regulator and the project developer, the latter can chose any level of
emission reductions ˜ e but report to have actually reduced more. Note that, with
rational actors, reported emission reductions z will never be less than the actual
reductions ˜ e as the value of the certiﬁcates is positive. It is also assumed that for
all projects there exists a maximum level of plausible emission reductions e, i.e. for
reports above this level no certiﬁcates will be issued. In the context of the CDM,
this upper limit can be interpreted as restrictions to plausible baseline emissions
established by the CDM Executive Board. Thus, formally the reported emission
reductions are deﬁned as z ∈ [˜ e,e].
In order to increase the incentive for truthful reporting, the regulator has the pos-
sibility to monitor the projects. The probability of being monitored for each project
type is α, with α ∈ [0;1]. It is assumed that this probability is known to the project
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participants. In an application to the Clean Development Mechanism, α would be
determined by the expected frequency of ’spot-checks’ on each project type by the
CDM Executive Board. The diﬀerent projects are assumed to diﬀer with respect
to their ’veriﬁability’, which is expressed through a project-speciﬁc probability β. If
β is 1 and the regulator monitors the project he is capable to determine without
further problems whether the ﬁrm has overreported or not. The closer β is to 0,
the more improbable is the success of such an assessment. Hence, the intensity
of the information asymmetry is assumed to vary across the diﬀerent project types
and might become large enough that a veriﬁcation through the regulator does not
necessarily lead to the discovery of misreporting. Assuming diﬀerent levels of veriﬁ-
ability is quite plausible if it is kept in mind that for any given project overreporting
can be the result of either a misstated baseline, underreported project reductions,
or both. In order to be able to isolate the eﬀects of such diﬀerences in veriﬁability,
it is assumed in the following that this is the only variable in which projects diﬀer.
In all other parameters the diﬀerent projects are treated as being identical.
In case overreporting is discovered the project participants are required to pay
back the revenue from overreported reductions and in addition to pay a ﬁne. The
regulator is assumed to make the ﬁne contingent on the ’magnitude of the lie’ x,
which is deﬁned as x = z − e. The relationship between the overreported amount
and the corresponding ﬁne is determined by the legislator of the scheme and deﬁned
through the penalty function θ(x), with θ(0) = 0, θ′(x) > 0, and θ′′(x) > 0 for
x > 0. Note that in order to have a deterrence eﬀect, this function is a priori
known by the regulated project parties. The assumption that the penalty is convex
in the magnitude of the oﬀense is quite realistic, as it seems to be in line with legal
practice under many diﬀerent circumstances.4
With incomplete enforceability of truthful reports, the project participants’ op-
timal decision problem is altered. Taking into account the assumptions on the




where C(e,z,α,β) = c(e) − pz + αβp(z − e) + αβθ(z − e)
It is hence taken into account within the cost function that in case overreporting
is discovered, the project participants will have to give back the excess certiﬁcates
and pay a ﬁne according to the progressive penalty schedule θ. The ﬁrst order
conditions for (3) are:
∂C
∂e
= c′(e) − αβp − αβθ′(z − e) = 0 (4)
∂C
∂z
= −p + αβp + αβθ′(z − e) = 0 (5)
The solutions to these necessary conditions indeed determine a local minimum,
as is proven in the mathematical appendix. It is however to be noted that the
optimization program in (3) is, in fact, also constrained through the domains of the
variables z and e. Depending on the values for the overall probability of discovery,
i.e. αβ, the project participant’s optimization can hence result in a corner solution.
4The assumption of convex punishment is widely used in a large part of the literature on
incomplete enforcement. See, for example, Harford (1978), Harford (1987), Sandmo (2002),
Cremer and Gahvari (2002), and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
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This is deﬁnitely the case if the probability of discovery is zero. In this case, the
project participants would chose the maximum plausible amount for the reported
emissions, i.e. z = e, while actually choosing the minimum possible amount of
emission reductions, i.e. e = e. This result reﬂects a complete unenforceability of
truthful reporting and can, in fact, only occur with either an inactive regulator or a
complete lack of veriﬁability of the project.
For those cases where the probability of discovery is positive, the expected
penalty in case of discovery provides an incentive to reduce the overreported amount
x, which is deﬁned as x = z − e. To achieve such a reduction in x the project
parties can either increase the amount of actual emission reductions, or decrease the
amount of reported reductions, or both. In order to understand the optimization of
the participants, it is to bear in mind that a reduction in z would entail a decrease
in issued certiﬁcates by a corresponding amount. Hence, the ’cost’ for reducing
reported emissions is equal to the price of the certiﬁcates p. As a consequence, with
increasing values of αβ, cost-minimizing project parties will always prefer to hold
z = e and to rather increase their actual reductions e as long as the marginal cost
of abatement remain lower than the certiﬁcate price p. Consequently, a reduction in
z will only occur if e is reduced to the level e∗, i.e. the ﬁrst best optimal reduction
level which is implicitly deﬁned through equation (2). Hence, only if αβ are high
enough to induce e∗ the level of z chosen will be determined through condition (5).
Finally, if the probability of discovery is high enough, the expected penalty will be
large enough to completely deter opportunistic overreporting, such that x = 0.
These intuitive considerations are expressed more formally within proposition 1,
also deﬁning the respective thresholds for the monitoring probability. The proposi-
tion represents in fact an adaptation of the ﬁndings of Macho-Stadler and Perez-
Castrillo (2006) to the case of credit-based emissions trading.
Proposition 1. For a given price of certiﬁcate p, audit probability α, a penalty
function θ(x), and a level of overreporting x = z − e, the optimal emission and
report decisions (e0,z0) for the project of type β are:
(a) If αβ = 0, then e0 = e and z0 = e.
(b) If αβ ∈ ]0,
p
p+θ′(e−e∗)[ , then e0 ∈ (e,e∗) and z0 = e, with
ce(e0) − αβp − αβθ′(e − e0) = 0. (6)




p+θ′(0)[ , then e0 = e∗ and z0 ∈ ]e∗,e] as
deﬁned by:
−p + αβp + αβθ
′(z
0 − e
∗) = 0 (7)
(d) If αβ ≥
p
p+θ′(0), then e0 = e∗ and z0 = e∗.
Proof: See mathematical Appendix.
Figure 1 depicts the changes in levels of actual abatement and of reported re-
ductions chosen by the project parties for diﬀerent levels of probability of being
punished. As implied by the proposition, the probability features several thresholds
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leading to a change in cost minimizing behavior. The ﬁgure also depicts the proba-
bility ranges within which the cases (a) to (d) hold. As expressed within proposition
1 (a), a zero probability of being punished induces the reduction and reporting lev-
els that maximize overreported emissions. Within range (b) the project participants
prefer to increase the level of actual reductions, while holding z at the maximum
plausible level e. With further increase of the probability of being discovered, the
actual reductions are held at the level e∗ while the reported reductions are reduced,
as depicted in ﬁeld (c). With a high enough probability of punishment, the parties













 p + θ' (e - e*)
p
 p + θ' (0)
e
Figure 1: Firm’s reported and actual emission reductions related to their monitoring
probability
[Firm’s reported and actual emission reductions]
4 Optimal Monitoring Policy with an unlimited Bud-
get
Given the optimizing behavior of the project participants as derived above, a rational
regulator needs to identify an optimal monitoring strategy. In order to model the
monitoring decision with an existing project pool, the regulator is assumed to face a
population of already registered projects. As explained before, the diﬀerent projects
are supposed to vary only with respect to their veriﬁability, which is parameterized by
β. The project speciﬁc probability β is distributed over the interval [0,1] according
to the density function f(β), with f(β) > 0 for all β ∈ [0,1], and the cumulative
function F(β).
The objective of the enforcement agency is to minimize overall emissions, oc-
curring within the regulatory scheme. When choosing the level of audit pressure
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for each project type, the regulator needs to account for the fact that credit-based
systems fundamentally diﬀer from other environmental policy instruments. Within
cap-and-trade emissions trading or an emissions tax system, the only variable that is
to be minimized are the actual emissions of the scheme’s participants. Consequently,
actors situated within area (c) of ﬁgure 1 would not require a further increase in the
monitoring probability α. For a credit-based system, like the Clean Development
Mechanism, restricting enforcement on the actual emissions would not necessarily
minimize overall emissions. Given that the credits generated through the projects
are being used to oﬀset emissions elsewhere, an over-issuance of such credits due
to false reporting would lead to an undesired increase in global emissions compared
to the full enforcement case. Hence, unlike other environmental policy instruments,
credit-based systems require the regulator to minimize not only the actual reductions
e but also the reported reductions z.
Within the model presented here, optimal enforcement implies a minimization
of overreporting, expressed through x = z − e, over the whole project population,
parameterized by β. For simplicity, the cost of one unit of audit is normalized to one.
To determine the optimal enforcement policy, the enforcement agency decides on









a(β)f(β)dβ ≤ B (9)
and
e(β),z(β) ∈ argmin C(β,α;e,z) (10)
Hence, to choose an optimal monitoring scheme, the agency needs to take into
account its budget constraint (9), and the proﬁt maximization of the single project
participants, expressed through constraint (10). Within this section we only consider
the second constraint to be binding.
As the choices of z and e for the diﬀerent projects depend on the overall prob-
ability of being punished αβ, the optimal level of α varies for each project type
according to its individual probability of veriﬁability β. Hence, taking the project
parties’ optimization into account, for each threshold identiﬁed in proposition 1, a
speciﬁc value of α can be deﬁned. First, we deﬁne:
ˆ α(β) ≡
p
β[p + θ′(e − e∗)]
(11)
as the minimum probability that induces an emission level of e∗. As α,β ∈ [0,1],
this probability level is only ’feasible’ when ˆ α(β) ≤ 1, i.e. β ≥ ˆ β, where:
ˆ β ≡
p
[p + θ′(e − e∗)]
11 August 20104 Optimal Monitoring Policy with an unlimited Budget
A ﬁrm with β < ˆ β pollutes more than e∗ even at audit probability α = 1, since





as the minimum audit probability that induces a report z = e = e∗, i.e. truthful




Taking these diﬀerent thresholds into account, it becomes clear that the assumed
structure on the information asymmetries between regulator and project participants
does not allow for the realization of the full information outcome. For low levels of
β even an audit probability of α = 1 is not suﬃcient to induce truthful reporting.
Consequently, even with an unlimited budget the minimum global pollution level
that an agency can achieve, is restricted by the informational constraints. This
maximum level of global emission reductions induced by the credit-scheme given an
unlimited budget can be deﬁned as:
eMAX
β ≡
  ˆ β
0
(e∗∗(β)−e)f(β)dβ +
  ˇ β
ˆ β
(e∗ −z∗∗(β))f(β)dβ +[1−F(ˇ β)]e∗, (12)
where e∗∗ and z∗∗ are implicitly deﬁned by
ce(e∗∗) − αβp − αβθ′(e∗∗) = 0, for β ∈ (0, ˆ β]
and
−p + αβp + αβθ′(z∗∗ − e∗) = 0, for β ∈ (ˆ β, ˇ β)
The ﬁrst term in (12) measures the overall impact on reductions of projects
which will overpollute and overreport even if the monitoring probability α is equal
to one. These projects are situated in ﬁeld (b) of ﬁgure 1. The second term ex-
presses the impact on reductions of projects within ﬁeld (c), achieving the optimal
level of actual reductions but which can not be completely deterred from overre-
porting. The last term adds the reduction level of projects that are induced to fully
comply to the terms of the mechanism.
The deﬁnition in (12) can be used to calculate the minimum budget necessary
to achieve eMAX
β . We denote this minimum budget by ¯ B, which is deﬁned through:




Proposition 2 immediately follows:
Proposition 2. When B ≥ ¯ B the cost-minimizing agency sets an audit policy that
satisﬁes α(β) = 1, for β ∈ [0, ˇ β[ and α(β) ∈ [ˇ α(β),1] for β ∈ [ˇ β,1].
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Proposition 2 has an important implication for the design of audit policies for
credit-based systems. In case such a scheme includes projects with large information
asymmetries between project participants and the regulator, an increase in budget
does not necessarily lead to a reduction in overreporting. As soon as the budget
level ¯ B is reached, the marginal rate of deterrence equals zero. Hence, even if a
maximization of reductions is the only objective of the agency, eﬃciency requires
that the auditing budget of the regulator should be capped at ¯ B.
5 Monitoring with a Limited Budget
In practice, it is likely that the number of audits which can be performed by the
regulator is constrained by his budget. After all, budget ¯ B implies that all projects
situated in regions (b) and (c) in ﬁgure 1 are audited with probability one. In the
context of the Clean Development Mechanism, for example, this would mean that
the Executive Board will carry out audits for projects with a lesser potential of
veriﬁability with certainty. This would not be in line with the declared approach to
carry out ’spot-checks’ for project control which are by deﬁnition associated with a
probability lower than one. It is hence realistic to assume that the budget constraint
(9) of the regulator’s optimization problem is binding. Thus, in the following it is
assumed that B ≤ ¯ B.
Within the budget-constrained optimization, it is again to be taken into account
that the regulator is not only interested in achieving an optimal level of actual
reductions e—as would be the case for other policy instruments—but that the
speciﬁcities of the credit-based approach require to take also the reported reductions
z into account. Again this is due to the fact that issued CDM certiﬁcates are
used to oﬀset emissions elsewhere. The regulator needs hence to decide for which
project types an increase in spot-check frequency would result in the largest decrease
in overall emissions. In this context, it is of particular importance whether the
monitoring budget should rather be spent on ﬁrms in region (b) or (c) in ﬁgure
1. It is by considering this trade-oﬀ that the present considerations diﬀer most
from the analysis of incomplete enforcement of environmental taxes, as carried out
by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006). Generally, for any two projects with
probability of veriﬁcation β1 and β2, a marginal shift δ in monitoring eﬀort from















    
    
e − e, for αβ = 0
e − e(αβ), for 0 < αβ <
p
p+θ′(e−e∗)
z(αβ) − e∗, for
p





p+θ′(0) < αβ ≤ 1
Note that the rational regulator will never increase monitoring pressure for ﬁrms
which are already in full compliance. Consequently, the case αβ >
p
p+θ′(0) will never
occur. Furthermore, for positive α, the case αβ = 0 can only occur if β is zero.
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Choosing α = 0 for this case is straightforward. Hence, identifying an eﬃcient audit-
ing policy through condition (14) mainly involves a trade-oﬀ in monitoring pressure
between the two regions (b) and (c). This requires the comparison of the respective
slopes of e(α) and z(α). As both of these functions result from the optimizing
behavior of the project participants in response to the ex ante communicated α for
each project type, these slopes can be derived from (4) and (5) by applying the
Implicit Function Theorem. The corresponding partial derivatives are:
∂e
∂α
= β·e′(αβ) = β ·
p + θ′(¯ e − e(αβ))
c′′(e(αβ)) + αβθ′′(¯ e − e(αβ))
, for αβ ∈ ]0,
p






= −β · z
′(αβ) = −
p + θ′(z(αβ) − e∗)
α θ′′(z(αβ) − e∗)
,for αβ ∈ [
p






Hence, as it is to be expected, within both regions (b) and (c) the amount of
overreported reductions x = z−e is decreasing in the overall probability of discovery.
As both slopes are a function of the penalty θ(x), and ∂e
∂α additionally depends on
the abatement costs c(e), identifying the optimal auditing policy for each β-type
ﬁrm is only possible if additional assumptions are made. However, even the quite
general forms of (15) and (16) allow to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under a limited budget B < B, optimal monitoring policy implies
that there exists a threshold βl(B) > 0, such that the regulator chooses α = 0 for
β ≤ βl(B). Projects with β > βl(B) will always be monitored with α > 0.
Proof: See mathematical appendix.
Proposition 3 allows a ﬁrst interesting insight in the optimal distribution of
audit pressure. It states that a budget-constrained rational regulator will never
audit those projects that are most diﬃcult to monitor, while all other projects will
always be monitored with positive probability. It is, however, not possible under the
given assumptions to make any further propositions on the intensity of monitoring
pressure for those projects with levels of veriﬁability lying above that threshold.
Hence, further insights can only be gained if the analysis is restricted by making
additional assumptions. Yet, before turning to these assumptions it is useful to
ﬁrst introduce some simpliﬁcations in notation. Denote with q the marginal penalty
to be paid if project participants are caught overreporting by the amount x(αβ).
Hence:
q(x) ≡ p + θ′(x)




Taking these changes in notation into account we make the following assump-
tion.
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Assumption 1. For x = z − e, with e ∈ [e;e] and z ∈ [˜ e,e] where ˜ e is the actual
level of emission reductions achieved by the project, assume that ρ(x) is weakly









Note that by the assumptions initially made in section 3, both, q(·) and q′(·) are
strictly larger than zero. Hence assumption 1 is, for example, fulﬁlled in the case of
a polynomial penalty function of the form θ(x) = m·xn+
 n−1
i=0 ai·xi, with m > 0,
ai ≥ 0, and n ≥ 2. As shown in the mathematical appendix, Assumption 1 is a
suﬃcient condition for both, e′(α) and −z′(α), to be decreasing in α for any β > 0.
This allows us to identify two other thresholds which are important for determining
the optimal monitoring policy. The nature and conditions for existence of these
thresholds are stated within within the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 and given a limited budget B < B, the optimal
monitoring policy of the regulator is characterized by the following:








q(e − e∗) · c′′(e)
q′(e − e∗) · q(e − e)
(17)
there exists a threshold βm(B) > βl(B) such that z < e for all β > βm(B).
The value of βm(B) is non-decreasing in B. Furthermore, for all cases where
βl(B) is strictly larger than
z
′(ˆ α(1))
e′(0) , the value of βl(B) is non-increasing in
B.









q′(0) · q(e − e)
(18)
there exists a threshold βh(B), such that the regulator induces z = e for ﬁrms
with β ≥ βh(B). The value of βh(B) is non-increasing in B.
(iii) For any B0 for which βl(B0) fulﬁlls condition (17) (condition (18)), the
condition is also fulﬁlled for any βl(B), for which B > B0.
Proof: See mathematical Appendix.
Proposition 4 states the conditions for the existence of the ranges (c) and (d)
under a limited budget. The budget constraint determines in fact the level of βl—the
threshold from which on the regulator prefers to refrain from monitoring the projects.
The existence of this threshold βl is a precondition for the existence of the other
two thresholds deﬁned in the proposition. In fact, as is shown in the mathematical
appendix, the conditions for the existence of these additional thresholds are derived
through the comparison of the slopes of x = z − e for the highest β-values of
the set of monitored projects, i.e. β = 1, and the set of non-monitored projects,
i.e. βl. Note that for any given combination of certiﬁcate price p, abatement cost
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function c(e), and penalty function θ(z − e) the right hand sides of (17) and (18)
are constant. As, under the given assumptions, the regulator has full information
on these determinants, the existence of both thresholds is unambiguous once the
lower threshold level βl(B) is known.
However, the behavior of βl(B) with respect to increases (decreases) in B might
be ambiguous. While it is safe to say that βl(B) decreases for large enough increases
in the budget B, this does not necessarily hold at the margin. Given that x(αβ)
features a ’jump’ at αβ =
p
p+θ′(e−e∗), a small increase in budget might lead to
abrupt changes in the audit strategy. Assume, for example, that B is marginally
smaller than ˆ α(1). Assume further that the gain from a decrease of z in z(ˆ α(1)) for
β = 1 is larger than the sum of reduced overreporting for all other projects currently
monitored. In this case an additional marginal increase in budget, would—according
to condition (14)—lead to a decrease in overall monitored projects in favor of an
increase in monitoring pressure for projects with β = 1. While such discontinuities
in βl(B) cannot be excluded, proposition 4 (iii) ensures that the upper threshold
values continue to exist if the monitoring budget is increased. In fact, as is shown
in the mathematical appendix the only reason for which the number of monitored
projects might be reduced with an increase in B, is that the two other threshold
values βm and βh are decreased. Hence, there exists a trade-oﬀ between increasing
the compliance of easy-to-verify projects or weakly increasing overall monitored
projects.
Once the behavior of βl(B) is understood, the threshold conditions formulated
within proposition 4 are quite intuitive. The ﬁrst factor in conditions (17) and (18)
represents the ratio of the marginal punishment and the marginal gain, i.e. the
price of one certiﬁcate, for a project facing the probability of discovery inducing a
report right at the respective threshold level. The larger this ratio, the more likely is
the existence of the respective threshold under a limited budget. This relationship
is plausible. If the power of the incentive to further reduce overreporting or to
fully comply is high it is, ceteris paribus, rational to actually induce these levels of
compliance. Note that given the deﬁnition of the marginal penalty the ﬁrst factor
in both conditions is always larger than 1.
The second factor within conditions (17) and (18) is also quite intuitive. It
represents in fact the ratio of the marginal increase in marginal abatement costs
at βl to the marginal decrease in marginal punishment at the respective threshold
level (i.e. βm or βh), each set in relationship to the marginal punishment at the
same level of overreporting. Note that an increase in marginal abatement costs
lowers the incentive to increase the actual emission reductions, while an increase
in the marginal penalty will raise this incentive. Consequently, the ratio represents
a measure for the intensity of the achievable incentives at βl compared to the
achievable incentives at the threshold level considered, i.e. βm or βh. The harder
it is to incentivize a change in behavior at βl the more likely it is that the regulator
prefers to increase auditing pressure for projects with a higher degree of veriﬁability.
While proposition 4 provides interesting insights on the conditions under which
the rational regulator decides to incentivize easier-to-verify projects toward full com-
pliance, it is not suitable for identifying how a given budget should be optimally
attributed to the diﬀerent project types. As this is probably the most eminent
question in the context of budget-constrained monitoring, we will present a few
interesting insights to that matter in the following section.
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5.1 Optimal Monitoring Pressure under a given Budget
The regulator interested in the minimization of overall overreporting needs to decide
on the optimal auditing pressure for each β-type project. Evidently, the optimal
monitoring strategy depends on the speciﬁc functional forms of the penalty function,
the abatement cost function, and the price of the certiﬁcate p. A speciﬁcation of
these determinants would, however, imply a considerable loss of generality. For
this reason, we will rather present those features of an optimal monitoring strategy,
which can be gained from the general model. As is shown in the mathematical
appendix the assumptions made so far are suﬃcient to allow for several important
insights on the optimal monitoring pressure α for speciﬁc ranges of β-type projects.
These insights are merged within the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under assumption 1 and if there exists a threshold value βm the
following holds:





q(e − e∗) · c′′(e)
q′(e − e∗) · q(e − e)
(19)
all projects with β < βm(B) will be monitored with probability α = 0.
(iii) For β ∈ [βm,1] the monitoring probability α is strictly decreasing in β.
(iv) For β ∈ ]βl,βm[ the sign of d α
d β is ambiguous under the given assumptions.
Yet, the following is true:
(a) if c(·) and θ(·) are quadratic functions a suﬃcient condition for α(β)
being strictly increasing (decreasing) for βl < β < βm is:
c′′(e) > (<)αβ · θ′′(e − e) ∀ e ∈ ] e ; e∗ [ (20)
(b) if α(β) is strictly decreasing for βl < β < βm and if c′′(e) is close to
zero, the optimal α for β close to βl is larger than for any β ≥ βm(B).
Proof: See mathematical Appendix.
Proposition 5 (i) implies that the optimal audit pressure at the threshold level βm—
from which on the projects will always achieve the optimal reductions—is strictly
larger than for projects with a slightly lower level of β. In fact, the function of
optimal audit pressure α(β) features a discontinuity at βm, involving an upwards
shift of the optimal audit pressure at this point.
Proposition 5 (ii) states the condition for which the threshold level βl for positive
audit pressure is only marginally lower than the threshold for projects achieving the
optimal level of emission reductions. Consequently, in such a case, there will be no
projects situated within the (b)-range of ﬁgure 1. Condition (19) is quite intuitive.
At the left-hand side is the ratio of marginal gains and punishment from misreporting
one unit for projects of type βm. Note that this ratio is always smaller than one.
The right hand side of condition (19) consists of the already introduced incentive
measure comparing the strength of incentives at βl and βm. The measure is larger
than one if a marginal change in punishment βl would lead to a larger change in
marginal abatement costs than the decrease it would yield in marginal punishment
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at βm. Hence, proposition 5 (ii) states that the regulator refrains completely from
monitoring projects with β < βm if such monitoring would lead to a lower change
in overreported emissions than could be achieved with incentivizing a decrease in z
for projects with β ≥ βm.
A very important result with respect to the optimal monitoring strategy is implied
within proposition 5 (iii). In fact, it states that independently of the existence of
the upper threshold level βh the regulator chooses to reduce the audit pressure with
increasing veriﬁability. Hence, even if it is possible to incentivize projects with high
β to fully comply, the regulator might decide to use his monitoring budget to rather
increase pressure on the projects with a lower degree of veriﬁability.
The behavior of α(β) for a decrease in β for βl < β < βm is more ambiguous.
While it is clear from proposition 5 (i) that the optimal audit pressure feature a sud-
den decrease if β decreases further than βm, the given assumptions are insuﬃcient
to determine if α(β) is increasing or decreasing for projects with a veriﬁability lower
than βm. Proposition 5 (iv) sheds some light on the optimal monitoring policy
for projects with such an intermediate degree of veriﬁability. Under the standard
assumption of cost and penalty functions being quadratic, optimal audit pressure
in this range of veriﬁability depends in principle on how strict the punishment is
compared to the respective abatement costs. For a relatively lax quadratic penalty
function, the ﬁrst inequality in condition (20) implies that an increase in actual
emissions would lead to a larger increase in marginal abatement costs than it would
decrease the marginal penalty. Hence, under these conditions, the change in in-
centive to misreport is larger than the change in disincentive stemming from the
punishment. As a consequence, it would be ineﬃcient to increase audit pressure for
lower degrees of veriﬁability, as the gains in compliance would be smaller than for
projects with higher degrees of veriﬁability. The opposite is true if the punishment
function is suﬃciently stricter than the abatement costs function, which is reﬂected
within the bracketed inequality in condition (20). In this case, the diﬀerence in
incentive change increases with decreasing β. Hence, simply spoken, if the punish-
ment is suﬃciently large, it becomes optimal for the regulator to exercise an ever
higher audit pressure for lower levels of veriﬁability within the range of βl < β < βm.
Interestingly, if the cost function is close enough to linear, the audit pressure will
be largest for projects with a β close to βl. Hence, the optimal audit policy of
the regulator crucially depends on the punishment scheme that is foreseen by the
legislative body.
In order to summarize the most important ﬁndings implied by the propositions
3 to 5, it is useful to visualize the optimal monitoring policy chosen by the regulator
under diﬀerent setups. In ﬁgure 2 we hence depict two diﬀerent situations for both of
which the budget level B is smaller than B but large enough to ensure the existence
of the threshold levels βm and βh. Consequently, in both of these setups all possible
levels of compliance (or misreporting) are realized. The depicted situations 1 and 2
diﬀer, in fact, only with respect to the form of the abatement cost function and its
relationship to the penalty function, leading to the diﬀerent monitoring strategies
α1(β) and α2(β). We ﬁrst describe the qualitative relationships in monitoring
pressure which is common to both of these setups. As stated in proposition 3, in
all cases the range of projects with the lowest degree of veriﬁability will not be
monitored at all. At ﬁrst sight, this might be considered as counter-intuitive as
it could be argued that projects with low veriﬁability would require a high level
of monitoring. However, given that the regulator is to maximize overall emission
IED Working Paper 13 18Optimal Monitoring for project-based Emissions Trading Systems
reductions under a constrained budget, it turns out to be more eﬃcient to completely
ignore projects below the threshold βl. Note that this would also be the case for an
environmental tax scheme as analyzed by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
β
βl(B) βm(B) βh(B) 1
α
e < e* ;  z = e e = z = e e  = z = e*  e = e* ;  z < e
α2(β) 
α1(β) 
Figure 2: Optimal auditing pressure for diﬀerent assumptions on abatement costs
Furthermore, in both situations depicted in ﬁgure 2, the optimal auditing pres-
sure features the upwards jump at βm, stated in proposition 5 (i). From this point
onwards optimal monitoring pressure is always strictly decreasing in the degree of
veriﬁability, as stated in proposition 5 (iii). Hence, the easier the projects are to
verify, the lower is the optimal monitoring probability for the respective project types.
This is particularly intuitive for those projects that are in complete compliance, i.e.
projects for which veriﬁability is larger or equal to βh. As these projects report
truthfully, an increase in monitoring probability would not lead to further increases
in overall emission reductions. For projects with an eﬃcient emission level but an
untruthful report, situated between βm and βh, the relationship in monitoring inten-
sity is more interesting. As already stated, with a credit-based system a regulator
interested in reducing overall emissions needs to take into account both, reductions
in overreporting through the report z, as well as actual emissions e. Hence, the fact
that this trade-oﬀ results in an unambiguous qualitative relationship for monitoring
projects situated in ﬁeld (c) of ﬁgure 1 is quite an important ﬁnding. Another inter-
esting result is the fact that for cases for which condition (19) holds, the monitoring
pressure for all β lower than βm would be zero. Consequently, the optimal monitor-
ing function would only consist of the right hand branch of both depicted functions
if the curvature of the abatement cost function were large enough. Hence, if the
increase in marginal abatement cost is particularly large, the optimal monitoring
would require to entirely refrain from monitoring all projects that would not yield
the eﬃcient level of reductions e∗.
The only ambiguity that exists in the qualitative relationship of optimal mon-
itoring is with respect to levels of veriﬁability situated between thresholds βl and
βm. As stated in proposition 5 (iv), optimal monitoring might either increase or
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decrease in the degree of project veriﬁability. This ambiguity can be resolved if func-
tional forms for the penalty and the abatement costs are speciﬁed. The optimal
monitoring strategy α1(β), depicted in ﬁgure 2, applies to a situation where the
increase and curvature of the quadratic cost function is relatively large compared to
the penalty function. This represents a case for which the unbracketed version of
condition (20) holds. Under such circumstances, the optimal monitoring probability
is strictly increasing in β for the respective range. In contrast, situation 2 repre-
sents a case where the abatement cost function is close to linear, while the penalty
function is comparatively strict. Hence, for βl < β < βm, the monitoring function
α2(β) is decreasing and reaches its largest values for β close to βl, as stated in
proposition 5 (iv)(b). The diﬀerentiation between these two cases hence showcases
that the regulator’s optimal strategy not only depends on his budget, but also on
the relationship between abatement costs and punishment.
While the abatement costs are usually beyond the control of a regulatory frame-
work, the penalty can be—at least in principle—easily adjusted. However, in the
real world it is likely that there exist legal and political constraints with respect to
the level of punishment. Clearly, the rule of law requires commensurability in legal
sanctions, such that the set of applicable penalties is considerably reduced. As far
as the CDM is concerned, it is also to note that sanctions beyond the rules of private
law would have to be accepted within the COPs. The present Kyoto rules do not
explicitly specify a penalty schedule for over-reporting of emissions. Yet, the model
results presented above emphasize the importance of stipulating speciﬁc sanctions
in order to assure a certain level of eﬀectiveness for the CDM. However, as with all
Kyoto rules, provisions on sanctions for the CDM are subject to the constraints of
political feasibility. Depending on whether these constraints allow for lax or stricter
sanctions the CDM Executive Board would have to decide on a monitoring strategy
which rather resembles to α1(β) or α2(β) in ﬁgure 2.
5.2 Regulation with Project Admission
The CDM has long been and in fact remains a matter of political dispute within
the Kyoto negotiations. Even in the potential buyer countries, the use of Certiﬁed
Emission Rights for meeting the Kyoto targets is not undisputed, as some observers
still challenge the morality of reducing emissions in third-world countries. As a
consequence, the sudden discovery of large scale fraud within a CDM project would
signiﬁcantly undermine the credibility of the whole Kyoto emissions trading regime
as an instrument to achieve emission reductions. Hence, it is plausible that the
architects of the Mechanism might want to reduce the risk of discovery of fraud.
As the above-presented model results have shown this is unlikely to be eﬀectively
achievable with project monitoring alone.
In this context it might be interesting to further reduce the potential of overre-
porting by adjusting the rules for project admission. Within the CDM for example,
the regulator can refuse the admission of a project if the Project Design Document
or the proposed Baseline Method do not correspond to the speciﬁed standards.5 It is
hence quite plausible that project admission standards could also include a minimum
level of veriﬁability. Such a standard could apply to both sources of overreporting
identiﬁed above, the baseline as well as the veriﬁcation of project emissions.
5The probability of rejection for a submitted CDM project is about 5 percent. (UNEP/Risoe
(2009))
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The above-presented model results can be used to gain valuable insights for
determining sensible cut-oﬀ levels for project admission. In the context of this
model, the Kyoto architects would have to decide on a maximum tolerable level of
opportunistic misreporting given a speciﬁed budget for the CDM Executive Board. It
is, for example, conceivable that the regulator implements a ’no tolerance’ constraint,
which would exclude all projects with a veriﬁability lower than the minimal βh(B).
In this case all projects would be in perfect compliance. Another intuitively sensible
cut oﬀ-level would be βm(B), implying that all projects will achieve the optimal
level of emission reductions, while cheating within the reported level would not
be perfectly deterred. Based on the experiences made up to the present, project
admission standards would have to be made more stringent until only projects with
a veriﬁability larger or equal to the respective threshold remain.
Note that, for the time being, the justiﬁcation for the inclusion of a minimum
level of veriﬁability within the project admission standards can only be based on
the political justiﬁcation depicted above. In light of the fact that there exists no
consensus on the allocatively optimal level of emission reductions, determining a
speciﬁc cut-oﬀ level based on welfare considerations would be particularly problem-
atic. Hence, as long as the exact level of the social cost of carbon is still disputed,
the optimal regulation under incomplete enforcement remains just as undetermined
as the optimal level of abatement.
6 Conclusion
The model presented within this paper allows some interesting insights into the
nature of optimal monitoring for credit-based systems, like the Clean Development
Mechanism. It was shown that under these circumstances even with an unlim-
ited monitoring budget, overreporting of reductions can not be completely disincen-
tivized. The most interesting results are, however, achieved under the more realistic
assumption of a budget constraint. For this purpose, the analysis above has been
restricted to a speciﬁc class of punishment functions, which includes polynomial
penalties.
While under an unlimited budget all projects with positive veriﬁability will be
monitored, the situation signiﬁcantly changes under the assumption of a budget
constraint. For this case, it is shown that a rational regulator will completely refrain
from monitoring those projects that are most diﬃcult to verify. Furthermore, for
those projects that are induced to achieve the optimal level of reductions the mon-
itoring pressure reduces with increasing veriﬁability of the projects. Both results
are in line with the ﬁndings by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) who ana-
lyze incomplete enforcement of emission taxes. However, unlike emission taxes, the
general principle of credit-based emission trading systems implies that the regulator
cannot refrain to simply maximize the actual emission reductions but needs also to
reduce the level of overstatement within the projects’ reported reductions. This is
due to the fact that certiﬁcates issued on the basis of the reports will be used to
oﬀset actual emissions elsewhere. Hence, contrary to the the tax case, the regulator
needs to minimize the overall level of overreporting.
Due to this diﬀerence in the objective function of the regulator, the optimal
monitoring strategy derived above signiﬁcantly diﬀers from those proposed in the
context of emission taxes or a cap-and-trade system. First, given a large enough bud-
get, the regulator will induce full compliance within the range of the easiest-to-verify
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projects. Second, with decreasing veriﬁability, the optimal audit pressure features a
’jump’ downwards as soon as the region of those projects is reached, for which the
regulator decides not to incentivize the optimal level of emission reductions. Within
this region of lower veriﬁability it depends on the exact interaction of incentives and
disincentives to increase compliance. The disincentives are determined through the
abatement cost function while the incentives stem from the punishment, which is
assumed to be increasing and convex in the overreported amount. Depending on
the functional forms of these two functions it is either possible that optimal auditing
pressure increases or decreases with a reduction in veriﬁability. Third, due to the
above-described discontinuity in auditing pressure, it might be possible that a small
increase in budget leads to a decrease in audited projects. A large enough budget
rise, however, will broaden the set of projects being monitored.
The monitoring budget, in fact, determines also the number of projects that are
situated within the diﬀerent regions of compliance. This leads to the interesting
insight that the regulator could include a speciﬁc level of veriﬁability within the
project admission criteria. This would guarantee that a maximum amount of over-
reporting will never be exceeded under a given budget. The latter result might be
especially interesting in the case of the Clean Development Mechanism, which is
by far not undisputed. The discovery of large fraudulent overreporting within that
mechanism would certainly entail a large damage to its credibility.
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Mathematical Appendix
Suﬃcient conditions for (4) and (5) denoting a minimum:
∂
2C
∂e2 = c′′(e) + αβθ′′(z − e) > 0
∂
2C






∂z2 − [ ∂
2C
∂e∂z]2 = αβc′′(e)θ′′(z − e) ≥ 0
=⇒ Solution for the ﬁrst order conditions (4) and (5) denote a minimum.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that e0 is, by deﬁnition, strictly positive. For αβ = 0, Equation (3) becomes
c(e) − pz which is evidently minimized by e0 = e and z0 = e, that is we are in
region (a).
For the rest of this proof it is supposed that αβ > 0. From equation (5) follows
that the report z0 only represents an interior solution if and only if αβθ′(0) <
p(1 − αβ) < αβθ′(e − e0).
When p(1 − αβ) ≥ αβθ′(0) the corner solution is z0 = e0, the ﬁrm’s report is
honest. Under these conditions, it follows from (4) that e0 = e∗. We are, thus in
region (d).
When αβθ′(e − e0) ≥ p(1 − αβ) the ﬁrm reports the maximum believable
emissions reduction, i.e. z0 = e. The ﬁrm thus chooses e0 satisfying (4) for z0 = e,
i.e. e0 satisﬁes (6). This pair, z0 = e and e0 satisfying (6), is indeed a candidate for
maximization if and only if αβθ′(e−e0) ≥ p(1−αβ) for the proposed e0. Given (6)
the previous inequality is equivalent to p ≥ c′(e − e0), i.e. e0 ≥ e∗. Thus, we are
in region (b). When both, emission reductions and report are interior, then adding
(4) and (5) this leads to p = c′(e−e0), i.e. e0 = e∗. The optimal report z0 in this
region is given by (5) for e0 = e∗, thus it is given by equation (7).  
Proof of Proposition 3:
For β → 0, ∂e
∂α, given by equation (15), approaches 0 as well, as e′(αβ) is never
inﬁnitely large for e ∈ [e,e]. Hence, according to condition (14), for β1 < β2 and β1
small enough, a decrease in α1 is always eﬃcient as long as α1 > 0 . Furthermore,
it is easy to check that for α = 0 the function e′(α) is increasing in β. Hence, it
follows from condition (14) that all projects with β > βl(B) are monitored with
positive probability.  
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to prove proposition 4 we ﬁrst state and prove the following two Lemmas.
Lemma A.1:
For any pair of projects with β1 and β2 for which the probability of
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Proof of Lemma A.1
Lemma A.1 follows directly from the eﬃciency condition (14). For any two ﬁrms
with veriﬁability β1 and β2 monitored with α1 and α2, condition (14) requires that










≤ 0, where xi = zi − ei (22)
As for any pair of projects with αiβi ∈ ] 0;
p
p+θ′(0)] the two projects can be alter-
natingly deﬁned as project 1 and 2, condition (22) only holds if ∂x1
∂α1 = ∂x2
∂α2.  
Next we show that Assumption 1 guarantees that −z′(α) and e′(α) are decreas-













Hence, −z′′(α) < 0 iﬀ:
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 2 , with x ∈ [0,(e − e),(e − e∗)[
Hence, e′′(α) < 0 iﬀ:
q




′′(e − x) + c
′′′(e − x) (24)
Assumption 1 is, thus, a suﬃcient condition for e′(α) and −z′(α) to be decreas-
ing in α. Hence, the following Lemma A.2 is straightforward.
Lemma A.2:
Under Assumption 1 the following holds for any β0 ∈ ] 0,1 ] monitored
with probability α0 ∈ ] 0,1 ]
e′(α0) = β0·e′(α0β0) < β0·e′(0), for αβ ∈ ]0,
p
p + θ′(e − e∗)
[ (25)
Based on Lemmas A.1 and A.2 we can now proceed with the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.
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Proof of Proposition 4(i)
Consider a project 1 with β1 = 1. In order to incentivize z < e for this project, the
regulator must set α1 > ˆ α(1). As, under assumption 1, −z′(α) is strictly decreasing




(p + θ′(e − e∗))2
pθ′′(e − e∗)
(26)
If the monitoring Budget is large enough, such that optimal monitoring requires
α1 for β1 = 1 then it follows from condition (14) and Lemma A.2, that −z′(α1) >
βl(B) · e′(0). Substituting this result into 26 yields:
βl(B)
p + θ′(e − e)
c′′(e)
<
(p + θ′(e − e∗))2
pθ′′(e − e∗)
This expression is equivalent to (17). Hence, if condition (17) holds, there exists
at least one project, namely β = 1, for which z < e.
Furthermore, if (17) holds, it follows from Lemma A.1 and the fact that z′(α) =
β ·z′(αβ) is decreasing in α and continuous in αβ that there exists a βm(B) < β1,
such that
−z′(α1) = βm(B) · z′(αmβm) = βm · z′(
p
p + θ′(e − e∗)
) (27)
For any β0 > βm, monitored with its optimal probability α0, the respective slope
of the report function is z′(α0) = β0 · z′(α0β0). As β0 > βm, Lemma A.1 implies







Under Assumption 1 this condition only holds if α0β0 > αmβm =
p
p+θ′(e−e∗).
Hence, all projects larger than βm will be incentivized to a report z0 which is strictly
lower than e.
An increase in B is equivalent to an increase of the overall sum of available α.
As under Assumption 1 ∂e
∂α and − ∂z
∂α are strictly decreasing in α, an increase in B
will equally decrease both sides of 21 for any β monitored with positive α. If βm
exists after the increase in B—which is proven below—the associated slope −z′(α)
at βm is deﬁned as the right hand side of (27). Hence, in order to fulﬁll (21), βm
must decrease with an increase in B. It is straightforward that the same applies for
βl for those cases where βm does not exist.  
Proof of Proposition 4(ii)
The proof is very similiar to the proof of proposition 4(i). For β = 1 z = 0 if
α ≥ ˇ α(1). Applying Lemmas A.1 and A.2 one can show that ˇ α(1) is only chosen if:
βl(B)





This expression is equivalent to (18). Hence, if condition (18) holds, there exists at
least one project, namely β = 1, for which z = e. The rest of the proof is analogous
to the proof of proposition 4.4 (i) and therefore omitted here.  
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Proof of Proposition 4(iii)
For all changes where βl(B) weakly decreases with B, the proof is trivial as condition
(17) (condition (18)) will necessarily be fulﬁlled. The only reason for which βl(B)
decreases with B is that the thusly available units of α can be used to increase
auditing pressure in the interval [βm;1], hence βm must exist. As − dz
dα is decreasing
and continuous in α, the same argument applies to βh.  
Proof of Proposition 5(i)




p + θ′(e − e(α0β0))
c′′(e(α0β0))) + α0β0θ′′(e − e(α0β0))
= βm
p + θ′(e − e∗)
c′′(e∗) + α0βmθ′′(e − e∗)
(29)
will only fulﬁll 21 if α0 < αm.  
Proof of Proposition 5(ii)
Proposition 5(ii) is proven by contradiction. Assume that under condition (19) a
project with β0 < βm(B) is monitored with positive probability. Then Lemmas A.1
and A.2 require
βm(B) ·
(p + θ′(e − e∗))2
pθ′′(e − e∗)
< β0 ·
p + θ′(e − e)
c′′(e)
(30)
As β0 < βm(B), (30) would only be true, if (19) were false.  
Proof of Proposition 5(iii)







Given Assumption 1, this inequality is only true if α1 > α2, which proves propo-
sition 5(ii).  
Proof of Proposition 5(iv)
If ∂e
∂α strictly increases (strictly decreases) in β then it follows from Lemma A.1 and
(15) that α(β1) is lower than (greater than) α(β2) for any β1 < β2 < βm.





′′(αβ) ≶ 0 (31)
if
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c′′(e(αβ))2−(αβ)2·θ′′(e−e(αβ))2 ≶ αβ(p+θ′(e−e(αβ)))·(c′′′(e(αβ))−θ′′′(e−e(αβ)))
(32)
If c(·) and θ(·) are quadratic functions, the right hand side of (32) is zero. The
rest of the proof for 5(iv)(a) is straightforward. It remains to prove 5(iv)(b). It
follows from proposition 5(iii) that the largest α(β) within the interval [βm;1] is




p + θ′(e − e∗)
) = β0 ·
p + θ′(¯ e − e(α0β0))
c′′(e(α0β0)) + α0β0θ′′(¯ e − e(α0β0))
(33)
For c”(e) close to zero and under Assumption 1 this equation will only hold if
α0 > αm.  
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